



United States
Midterm elections
on the eve of a
recession

Giovanna Mossetti
Macroeconomic Analysis
Research Department – Intesa Sanpaolo

24 October 2022

Executive summary: Good-bye, unified government!

- The 2022 midterm elections are likely to usher in another phase of **divided government**, after 2 years of Democratic control of both Congress and the Presidency.
- Currently, the central scenario is for a **Republican majority in the House and for a slim Democratic margin in the Senate**, opening up a 2-year period of political stalemate. The uncertainty of the result in the Senate has been increasing in recent weeks, with an improvement of Republicans in the polls.
- The Administration is likely to resort to executive orders in the areas of foreign policy, international trade and, possibly, immigration, to obtain some visible political results before the next elections.
- The lack of room for legislative manoeuvre may be challenging in 2023, when a recession is likely to hit the economy, in the wake of restrictive monetary policy aimed at reining in inflation. The economic policy action will be in the hands of the Fed, with **fiscal policy mostly frozen**.

Agenda

1 The economy is on the eve of a recession



2 Monetary policy is the only game in town

3 Political outlook: two years of stalemate ahead

A recession is all but guaranteed in 2023

The economy is slowing...

...and a recession is coming




Source: BEA, Intesa Sanpaolo forecasts

Source: NY Fed


Services are holding up, manufacturing is slowing down

Services are still carrying the day...

...as consumers catch up after the pandemic




Source: ISM



Source: BEA


Fixed investment: the transmission mechanism that never fails

It is only a matter of time before non-residential investment turns down



Source: BEA, ISM


Residential investment is already plunging, and will keep doing so in 2023



Source: BEA, S&P, Refinitiv-Datastream


The labor market is still tight, but it is a lagged indicator

Employment still strong, but slowing



Source: BLS

Record labor demand has fueled rapid wage growth, contributing to a wage/price spiral



Source: BLS, Atlanta Fed

Agenda

1 The economy is on the eve of a recession


2 Monetary policy is the only game in town

3 Political outlook: two years of stalemate ahead


Inflation keeps running and the Fed's chase will end in a recession

Monthly core inflation stubbornly elevated...

...due to ex-energy service prices, while core goods have been on a downward trend since the summer



Fonte: BLS




Fonte: Cleveland Fed

The Fed has been frontloading rate hikes since the summer: restrictive monetary policy is here to stay


Another **75pb hike is expected in November**. The FOMC will start debating the size of the following actions, as the risks are becoming two-sided. In early 2023 there will be a pause, to assess the effects of the restriction already in place.

The Fed's actions are working: real yields are in restrictive territory, with the risk of excessive tightening



Source: Refinitiv-Datastream

Fed funds rates are expected to be close to 5% in early 2023



• FOMC participants' fed funds target rate, Sept 2022
 — Median, Sept 2022
 — Fed Funds Futures 21/10/2022

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Refinitiv-Datastream

Agenda

1 The economy is on the eve of a recession

2 Monetary policy is the only game in town


3 Political outlook: two years of stalemate ahead

Democrats are going to lose seats in the House, but less than initially feared, and may hold the Senate


- The midterm elections on 8 November should mark the end of the Democrats' full control over Congress and the Presidency, restoring the divided government regime typical of the past decades.
- The **baseline scenario** is a return of the **House to Republican control** with the **Democrats retaining a slim majority in the Senate**. Since the summer, the Democrats' prospects have improved thanks to a number of political and economic successes, that appeared to contain the losses typically incurred by the President's party at the midterm elections.
- Legislative wins in Congress (two bipartisan bills and the Inflation Reduction Act, aimed mostly at healthcare and climate change), lower gasoline prices, the overturning of Roe vs Wade have increased Biden's popularity and strengthened the Democrats' standing. In any case, the chances for a Republican House are almost 100% even without a "red wave". In the past weeks, moreover, Republicans have regained some ground, implying a **very uncertain outcome in the Senate**.

Republicans are back, after a pro-Democrats summer

The Democrats' lead gained in the summer has vanished: Republicans are leading again in generic polls



Biden's approval has improved since the summer, but will not be enough to save the House



Source: Fivethirtyeight

Source: Reuters

Forecasts for the House and the Senate

- House of Representatives.** The House has 435 seats, renewed every 2 years. A majority requires 218 seats. 31 Democrats and 18 Republicans are retiring, leaving no incumbent. **Central scenario: Republican majority.**
- Senate.** The Senate has 100 seats, renewed staggered every 6 years, with 1/3 of seats expiring every 2 years. 35 sets up for election, 14 held by Democrats, 21 by Republicans. 1 Democrat and 5 Republicans are retiring. A majority requires 51 seats, in case of a tie the vice president provides the 51st vote. **Central scenario: uncertain,** with a marginal tilt in favor of Democrats.

House: an almost guaranteed Republican majority				
Democrats		Republicans		Toss ups
safe dem	168	safe GOP	159	
likely dem	29	likely GOP	15	
leans dem	10	leans GOP	6	
	207		215	13
memo: Current House				
Democrats+Ind.	220	Republicans	212	
3 vacant seats				

Source: Fivethirtyeight

Senate: neck and neck, again				
Democrats		Republicans		Toss ups
safe dem or not up	45	safe GOP or not up	44	
likely dem	3	likely GOP	2	
leans dem	1	leans GOP	3	
	49		49	2
memo: Current Senate				
Democrats+Ind.	50	Republicans	50	


Source: Fivethirtyeight

The political cleavage is likely to widen in 2023-24

- With only a few weeks to go before the vote, uncertainty on the outcome of the election for the Senate is increasing, leaving a unified Republican Congress as a possibility. Instead, poll data indicate that the probability of the Democrats holding the House is close to zero.
- The end of unified government, with different parties holding the Congress and the Presidency, should usher in a **period of stalemate for economic policy**, likely limited to renewing spending laws and, possibly, extending expiring measures. In case of a split Congress, the political outlook will be particularly divisive, with showdowns on the debt limit and a more pronounced stalemate. Our forecast overall is neutral in terms of fiscal policy, barring new emergencies resulting in bipartisan laws being approved. Biden's action will concentrate on **executive orders**, in the fields of foreign policy, international trade and, possibly, immigration.
- The November result may be more important on the strictly political front, for the judicial appointments if Democrats hold the Senate, and as a signal ahead of the presidential campaign, kicking off in January 2023. See you in 2024!

Polarization keeps rising: a common ground is less likely with every new legislature

Republicans have moved further to the right than Democrats have moved to the left
(average ideology of members, by Congress)



Note: data excludes non voting delegates as well as lawmakers who officially served but (due to illness, resignation or other factors) didn't have a scorable voting record for a given Congress. Party categories include independents who caucus(ed) with that party. Members who changed parties or became independent during a Congress were classified according to the status they held the longest during that Congress. For most of the 116th Congress, Rep. Amash of Michigan was either an independent or a libertarian and didn't caucus with either major party. Source: Pew Research Center.

Important Information

Analyst Certification and Other Important Disclosures

The analysts drafting this report state that the opinions, forecasts, and estimates contained herein are the result of independent and subjective evaluation of the data and information obtained and no part of their compensation has been, is, or will be directly or indirectly linked to the views expressed.

This research has been prepared by Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. and distributed by Intesa Sanpaolo SpA-London Branch (a member of the London Stock Exchange) and Intesa Sanpaolo IMI Securities Corp (a member of the NYSE and FINRA). Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. accepts full responsibility for the contents of this report. Please also note that Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. reserves the right to issue this document to its own clients. Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. is authorised by the Banca d'Italia and is regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in the conduct of designated investment business in the UK and by the SEC for the conduct of US business.

Opinions and estimates in this research are as at the date of this material and are subject to change without notice to the recipient. Information and opinions have been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty is made as to their accuracy or correctness.

This report has been prepared solely for information purposes and is not intended as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any financial products. It should not be regarded as a substitute for the exercise of the recipient's own judgement.

No Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. entity accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct, consequential or indirect loss arising from any use of material contained in this report.

This document may only be reproduced or published with the name of Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A..

This document has been prepared and issued for, and thereof is intended for use by, Companies which have suitable knowledge of financial markets, which are exposed to the volatility of interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices and which are capable of evaluating risks independently.

Therefore, such materials may not be suitable for all investors and recipients are urged to seek the advice of their relationship manager/independent financial advisor for any necessary explanation of the contents thereof.

Person and residents in the UK: this document is not for distribution in the United Kingdom to persons who would be defined as private customers under rules of the FCA.

US persons: this document is intended for distribution in the United States only to Major US Institutional Investors as defined in SEC Rule 15c-6. US Customers wishing to effect a transaction should do so only by contacting a representative at Intesa Sanpaolo IMI Securities Corp. in the US (see contact details below).

Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. issues and circulates research to Major Institutional Investors in the USA only through Intesa Sanpaolo IMI Securities Corp., 1 William Street, New York, NY 10004, USA, Tel: (1) 212 326 1199.

Inducements in relation to research

Pursuant to the provisions of Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593, this document can be qualified as an acceptable minor non-monetary benefit as it is:

- macro-economic analysis or Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities material made openly available to the general public on the Bank's website - Q&A on Investor Protection topics - ESMA 35-43-349, Question 8 & 9.

Method of distribution

This document is for the exclusive use of the recipient with whom it is shared by Intesa Sanpaolo and may not be reproduced, redistributed, directly or indirectly, to third parties or published, in whole or in part, for any reason, without prior consent expressed by Intesa Sanpaolo. The copyright and all other intellectual property rights on the data, information, opinions and assessments referred to in this information document are the exclusive domain of the Intesa Sanpaolo banking group, unless otherwise indicated. Such data, information, opinions and assessments cannot be the subject of further distribution or reproduction in any form and using any technique, even partially, except with express written consent by Intesa Sanpaolo.

Persons who receive this document are obliged to comply with the above indications

Valuation Methodology

Comments on macroeconomic data are prepared based on macroeconomic and market news and data available via information providers such as Bloomberg and Refinitiv-Datastream. Macroeconomic, exchange rates and interest rate forecasts are prepared by the Intesa Sanpaolo Research Department, using dedicated econometric models. Forecasts are obtained using analyses of historical statistical data series made available by the leading data providers and also on the basis of consensus data, taking account of appropriate connections between them.

Disclosure of potential conflicts of interest

Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. and the other companies belonging to the Intesa Sanpaolo Banking Group (jointly also the "Intesa Sanpaolo Banking Group") have adopted written guidelines "Organisational, management and control model" pursuant to Legislative Decree 8 June, 2001 no. 231 (available at the Intesa Sanpaolo website, webpage <https://group.intesasanpaolo.com/en/governance/leg-decree-231-2001>) setting forth practices and procedures, in accordance with applicable regulations by the competent Italian authorities and best international practice, including those known as Information Barriers, to restrict the flow of information, namely inside and/or confidential information, to prevent the misuse of such information and to prevent any conflicts of interest arising from the many activities of the Intesa Sanpaolo Banking Group which may adversely affect the interests of the customer in accordance with current regulations.

In particular, the description of the measures taken to manage interest and conflicts of interest – related to Articles 5 and 6 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/958 of 9 March 2016 supplementing Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for the technical arrangements for objective presentation of investment recommendations or other information recommending or suggesting an investment strategy and for disclosure of particular interests or indications of conflicts of interest as subsequently amended and supplemented, the FINRA Rule 2241, as well as the FCA Conduct of Business Sourcebook rules COBS 12.4 - between the Intesa Sanpaolo Banking Group and issuers of financial instruments, and their group companies, and referred to in research products produced by analysts at Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. is available in the "Rules for Research" and in the extract of the "Corporate model on the management of inside information and conflicts of interest" published on the website of Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A., webpage <https://group.intesasanpaolo.com/en/research/RegulatoryDisclosures>. This documentation is available to the recipient of this research upon making a written request to the Compliance Department, Intesa San Paolo S.p.A., Via Hoepli, 10 – 20121 Milan – Italy.

Furthermore, in accordance with the aforesaid regulations, the disclosures of the Intesa Sanpaolo Banking Group's interests and conflicts of interest are available through webpage <https://group.intesasanpaolo.com/en/research/RegulatoryDisclosures/archive-of-intesa-sanpaolo-group-s-conflicts-of-interest>. The conflicts of interest published on the internet site are updated to at least the day before the publishing date of this report. We highlight that disclosures are also available to the recipient of this report upon making a written request to Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. – Macroeconomic Analysis, Via Romagnosi, 5 - 20121 Milan - Italy.

Intesa Sanpaolo acts as market maker in the wholesale markets for the government securities of the main European countries and also acts as Government Bond Specialist, or in comparable roles, for the government securities issued by the Republic of Italy, by the Federal Republic of Germany, by the Hellenic Republic, by the European Stability Mechanism and by the European Financial Stability Facility.

Report prepared by:

Giovanna Mossetti, *Macroeconomic Analysis, Research Department, Intesa Sanpaolo*