


## Will the Fed tip the US economy into a recession?




Giovanna Mossetti

Intesa Sanpaolo – Research Department

31 August 2022


# This is still NOT a recession

This is not (yet) a recession, but it could become one next year



Note: Sahm Recession Indicator signals the start of a recession when the three-month moving average of the national unemployment rate rises by 0.50 percentage points or more relative to its low during the previous 12 months. Source: St Louis Fed


It will take a lot more economic pain to turn this economy around



Source: BLS


# The slowdown is here, but so far it has not been painful

After two negative quarters, GDP is expected to grow again in Q3...



Source: BEA, ISM


...but the trend is downwards



Source: NY Fed, BEA


# Some recession indicators are flashing yellow

ISM manufacturing orders <50 are good  
(not perfect!) recession predictors: July  
new orders at 48



Source: ISM


Yield curves are in dangerous territory



Source: Refinitiv-Datastream


# Jobless claims are the best recession predictors: here, the light is still unclear

Jobless claims and  
unemployment rate: 1967-2020  
(pre-pandemic)



Source: BLS


Jobless claims have turned: a problem  
may be on the way, but it is not here yet!




Source: BLS

# Probably the current weakness is overstated, but the slowdown is undisputable

The gap between GDP and income keeps growing: GDP is likely to be revised up



If the discrepancy between GDP and GDI closes somewhere in the middle, as has happened in the past, 1H growth would not be negative




Note: Gross domestic output= average between GDP and GDI. Source: BEA, Intesa Sanpaolo calculations

Source: BEA, Intesa Sanpaolo calculations


# The actors in the downturn/1 – The GOOD (consumers)...

Never write off the US consumer, until the Fed's cavalry storms into the cycle



Source: BEA, Intesa Sanpaolo forecasts


Consumers keep consuming, shifting from goods to services



Source: BEA


# Two pillars supporting consumption: labor income...

Real disposable income turned positive again in July



Source: BEA

Labor income is back to its leading role in households' budgets




Source: BEA




## ...and savings from the pandemic

Households have accumulated deposits well in excess of pre-pandemic levels



Source: Federal Reserve Board, BEA


Debt service payments as a percent of disposable income are at historic lows



Source: Federal Reserve Board


# Actors in the downturn/2 – ...the BAD (firms and government)...

Business surveys and data show accelerating weakness, partly still due to supply constraints but partly now due to a demand downshift



Source: Markit


The Federal government's contribution to growth will be negative until early 2024



Source: Hutchins Center for Fiscal and Monetary Policy


# Actors in the downturn/3 – ...and the UGLY (housing)

Activity in the housing sector is cratering, due to elevated home prices and higher mortgage rates



Source: Census Bureau, National Association Homebuilders


But 2022 is not 2006: there is a massive, structural excess demand for homes



Source: Census Bureau


# Aggregate demand may be weakening, but the labor market is still (too) hot: record demand...

Employment keeps growing much faster than GDP, productivity is plummeting



Source: BEA, BLS


Non-farm payrolls rising at a brisk pace



Source: BLS


# ...in the face of persistently constrained supply

The unemployment rate keeps dropping, with participation 1.3pp below pre-Covid levels



Source: BLS


Around 10% of non-participating individuals are out of the labor force fearing Covid, app. 2M are not working due to long-Covid



Source: BLS


# As a result, demand for labor is still outstripping supply...

Excess demand for labor remains huge: in July, 11.2 M job openings and 2 job openings/unemployed



Source: BLS


Individuals are still quitting jobs at a record rate and finding employment fast



Note: job finding rate=fraction of unemployed workers in a given month who find jobs in the consecutive month.  
Source: BLS


# ...and labor compensation keeps growing at a pace inconsistent with price stability

It will take time for wage growth to turn around



Source: BLS, Atlanta Fed


Employment costs are inconsistent with price stability



Source: BLS


# Fed-induced weaker demand=>higher unemployment

The relationship between job openings and unemployment (Beveridge curve) has shifted out: if job openings drop, the unemployment may have to move significantly up



Source: BLS

The Phillips curve gives a similar message: lower inflation=>higher unemployment




Source: BLS




# What's up with inflation?

Underlying Inflation Gauge: too early to call it a turning point



Source: NY Fed


Inflation may have peaked, but it is a long way away from 2%



Source: BLS


# Inflation is not yet on a convincingly downward path: the Fed cannot change tack

Inflation may have peaked, but it is a long way away from 2%



Source: BLS


Monthly changes slower in July, but this is not the compelling evidence the Fed needs to slow rate hikes



Source: BEA, BLS


# Underlying inflation measures are still flashing red

Trimmed mean and median CPI signal that large price changes are widespread



Source: Cleveland Fed


In July, 51.2% of components of the personal consumption deflator increased by more than 3% ann.



Note: Percentage of components each month, weighted by their shares in total spending, for which prices grew between 0 and 2 percent (at an annual rate); between 2 and 3 percent; between 3 and 5 percent; between 5 and 10 percent; and more than 10 percent. Source: Dallas Fed


# Cyclical inflation still up, but expectations have turned

Cyclical inflation is still moving up, signaling broad demand pressures



Source: San Francisco Fed


Expectations have turned



Source: NY Fed, Refinitiv Datastream


# Goods: a mixed picture/1

**Gasoline: the price is falling, but remains historically elevated**



Source: EIA


**Food still flying high, no peak in sight**



Source: BLS


# Goods: a mixed picture/2

Global supply chain pressures stabilizing, but not retreating: the NY Fed estimates that inflation would have been 30% lower without supply bottlenecks



Source: NY Fed, BLS


Shipping costs have turned



Source: Refinitiv-Datastream


# Goods: a mixed picture/3

Core commodity inflation is still far from historical norms: post-Covid, the pass-through from import prices and labor costs has almost doubled (NY Fed)



Source: BLS


Extreme price increases are normalizing, but remain elevated



Source: BLS


# Business pricing power remains significant

**NFIB: close to a net 40% of firms plan higher prices**



Source: NFIB

**Markit PMI: selling prices still on the rise**




Source: Markit




# Services: a major headache for the Fed

Service prices still booming in housing...



Source: BLS


...but also in other sectors



Source: BLS


# Shelter costs amplified by scarce home supply in a phase of record low affordability

Housing is the largest contributor to higher core inflation



Source: BLS, Refinitiv-Datastream


Inertia in rent-setting and record low home affordability will keep pressures elevated well into 2023



Source: BLS


# Inflation is the Fed's "overarching goal" now: not even a "softish" landing can be guaranteed

The chances of a recession are high, based on historical experience



Source: Federal Reserve Board, BLS

FOMC and market forecasts are again at odds with each other




Source: Refinitiv-Datastream


# The Fed “will keep at it until we are confident the job is done”, no matter what happens to the labor market

The FOMC wants to enter into restrictive monetary policy to weaken demand further

Unemployment, at 3.5% now, must go up: every time the Fed pushed unemployment up by at least 0.3pp, a recession ensued



Note: Chart shows fed funds rates estimated using 7 different monetary policy rules and forecasts for macro variables from 3 different forecasters (CBO, Survey of Professional Forecasters and Cleveland Fed. Source: Cleveland Fed



Source: Federal Reserve Board, BLS

# “We must keep at it until the job is done”

## Powell in his own words (26.08.2022)

- “Restoring price stability will take some time and requires using our tools forcefully to bring demand and supply into better balance. Reducing inflation is likely to require a sustained period of below-trend growth. Moreover, there will very likely be some softening of labor market conditions. (...) These are the unfortunate costs of reducing inflation”.
- “We are moving our policy stance purposefully to a level that will be sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent. (...) In current circumstances, with inflation running far above 2 percent and the labor market extremely tight, estimates of longer-run neutral are not a place to stop or pause.”
- “Restoring price stability will likely require maintaining a restrictive policy stance for some time. The historical record cautions strongly against prematurely loosening policy. “
- “There is clearly a job to do in moderating demand to better align with supply. We are committed to doing that job.”
- “We are taking forceful and rapid steps to moderate demand so that it comes into better alignment with supply, and to keep inflation expectations anchored. We will keep at it until we are confident the job is done.”

# What rate hike in September?

## Who said what

- “July's increase in the target range was the second 75 basis point increase in as many meetings, and I said then that another unusually large increase could be appropriate at our next meeting. (...) Our decision at the September meeting will depend on the totality of the incoming data and the evolving outlook.” (J. Powell, 26.08.2022)
- “It's too soon to say, you know, what should we expect in September because we have some important data that's coming up” (E. George, 25.08.2022)
- “I want to see the next [inflation] reading and then decide.” “We need to get inflation under control no matter what” (P. Harker, 25.08.2022)
- “At this point, I'd toss a coin between (75 and 50 bp) the two.” If data remain strong and inflation doesn't clearly soften, “then it may make a case for (...) another 75 basis point move.” (R. Bostic, 24.08.2022)
- “We need to err on making sure getting inflation down and only relax when we see compelling evidence that inflation is well on its way back down to 2%” (N. Kashkhari, 23.08.2022)
- “I would lean toward the 75 basis points at this point. Again, I think we've got relatively good reads on the economy, and we've got very high inflation” (J. Bullard, 18.08.2022)

**We are upgrading our forecast for September from 50bps to 75bps, in light of Powell's speech and expectations for a solid August jobs report on 02.09.2022 and a still strong August core CPI (0.5% m/m) on 13.09.2022.**

## Conclusions: more hikes, higher recession risks

- US growth is slowing, but the economy is still expanding. Price pressures persist, in particular as a result of the tight labor market.
- **Aggregate demand must slow further to weaken labor market conditions**, as scarce supply is unlikely to turnaround soon, due to Covid, aging, headwinds to immigration.
- The Fed is committed to act until inflation is convincingly tamed. Historical experience shows that hiking rate cycles implemented with inflation above 4% and rising, and upturns in unemployment have always ended in a recession. **This time is unlikely to be different.**
- However, **not all recessions are born equal**. In the current case, some relevant features imply that **the recession may be shallow**: there are no evident financial excesses, household and firm balance sheets are in order, the Fed has turned back to a credibly anti-inflationary stance. Sources of amplified financial volatility seen in the dot-com and housing boom recessions are absent now.
- We currently **forecast rates at 4.25% at end-2022, with a peak at 4.5% in early 2023 and a turning point at end-2023.**

# Appendix - What is a recession?

## NBER Business Cycle Dating

- The NBER's definition emphasizes that **a recession involves a significant decline in economic activity that is spread across the economy and lasts more than a few months.** In our interpretation of this definition, we treat the three criteria—depth, diffusion, and duration—as somewhat interchangeable. That is, while each criterion needs to be met individually to some degree, extreme conditions revealed by one criterion may partially offset weaker indications from another. For example, in the case of the February 2020 peak in economic activity, the committee concluded that the subsequent drop in activity had been so great and so widely diffused throughout the economy that, even if it proved to be quite brief, the downturn should be classified as a recession.
- Because a recession must influence the economy broadly and not be confined to one sector, the (Business Cycle dating) committee emphasizes economy-wide measures of economic activity. (...) These include real personal income less transfers, nonfarm payroll employment, employment as measured by the household survey, real personal consumption expenditures, wholesale-retail sales adjusted for price changes, and industrial production.
- There is no fixed rule about what measures contribute information to the process or how they are weighted in our decisions. In recent decades, the two measures we have put the **most weight on are real personal income less transfers and non-farm payroll employment.**

*Note: our bold. Source: NBER*



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### Report prepared by:

Giovanna Mossetti, Research Department, *Intesa Sanpaolo*